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 In Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, decided in May of this year, the Ohio Supreme 
Court held that: “A beneficiary of a decedent's will may not maintain a negligence action 
against an attorney for the preparation of a deed that results in increased tax liability for 
the estate.”1 In doing so, the Court approved and followed2 its 1987 decision in Simon v. 
Zipperstein.
3
 Under Zipperstein, an attorney who prepares a will for a client can not be 
liable in negligence to a third person the client intended to benefit under the will unless 
(i) the third person was in privity with the client
4
 or (ii) there are special circumstances 
present, such as fraud, bad faith, collusion or other malicious conduct.
 
 
 
 
Facts and Lower Court Decisions 
 
 As recounted in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Shoemaker, in 1986, attorney 
Thomas Gindlesberger prepared a will for Margaret Schlegel that devised her estate to 
her three children. Four years later, Gindlesberger prepared a deed for Ms. Schlegel that 
conveyed her farm to one of her children and his wife, while retaining a life estate for 
Ms. Schlegel. When Ms. Schlegel died in 2003, the transfer of the farm resulted in 
federal and state estate tax liabilities and necessitated the sale of estate assets to pay the 
taxes. The Schlegel children sued Gindlesberger for negligence.
5
 He responded with a 
motion for summary judgment asserting that because he did not have an attorney client 
relationship with the children, they lacked standing to bring a claim of negligence against 
him.
6
 
 
 The Holmes County Court of Common Pleas granted Gindlesberger’s motion for 
summary judgment and the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed.
7
 Both lower court 
decisions relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Zipperstein, the holding of which is 
summarized above. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that it was bound by Zipperstein, but “invited” the Supreme Court to 
revisit the issue “because there should be a remedy to any wrong.”8 
 
 
The Supreme Court’s Decision 
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 As summarized in the Supreme Court’s opinion, the Schlegel children argued that 
Zipperstein should be overruled for two reasons. First, in recent years courts in a number 
of other jurisdictions have abandoned the lack of privity defense.
9
  Not persuaded, the 
Court acknowledged that the Zipperstein strict privity rule is the minority rule, but noted 
that that also was the case when Zipperstein was decided in 1987.
10
 
 
 Second, and more important, the children argued that injury to intended 
beneficiaries from an estate planner’s negligence is foreseeable, and that abandoning the 
privity defense is necessary to hold estate planners accountable.
11
 In response, the 
Supreme Court noted that courts from other jurisdictions have suggested that the personal 
representative of a decedent’s estate might be able to pursue a malpractice claim against 
the decedent’s lawyer without running afoul of the privity rule, and stated: “This may 
well be a solution to the problem, but it is a question for another day.”12 (Although it may 
be a question for another day for the Ohio Supreme Court, a 2000 Court of Appeals 
decision allowed a claim by a decedent’s personal representative to proceed against the 
decedent’s estate planning attorney for the attorney’s alleged negligence that resulted in 
the payment of federal estate taxes that arguably could have been avoided.
13
) 
 
 In that regard, an interesting aspect of Shoemaker is that the claims against 
Gindlesberger were brought not only by the children individually, but also by one of 
them as executor of Ms. Schlegel’s estate.14 Given the Court’s discussion of the 
possibility of an estate being able to pursue a malpractice claim against a decedent’s 
estate planning lawyer, it seems unlikely that the Court would have affirmed a lower 
court grant of summary judgment with respect to the estate’s claim, at least without 
discussing it. Further, in its summary of the background of the case, the Court stated: 
“The trial court granted Gindlesberger’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the 
negligence claims filed by the Schlegel children.”15 That statement arguably indicates 
that the Court viewed the trial court’s ruling as applying only to the claims of the 
children, individually. However, as mentioned, one of the children was the executor of 
the estate and a party to the action against Gindlesberger in that capacity, and the 
statement could thus also have been referring to the negligence claim of that child, as 
executor. Moreover, the Court’s majority opinion concludes by stating “we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Holmes County.”16 While it is not clear from the 
Court of Appeals’ opinion that its judgment affirmed a grant of summary judgment by the 
trial court against the estate as well as against the children individually,
17
 that may have 
been the case. (In that regard, the heading of the Court of Appeals’ opinion identifies one 
of the parties as “Robert E. Schlegel, Executor of the Estate of Margaret E. Schlegel, et. 
al., Plaintiffs-Appellees.”18) 
 
At any rate, with respect to the possibility of a claim being brought by an executor 
of a decedent’s estate against the decedent’s estate planning lawyer, often the estate will 
not have incurred a loss. Rather, if an attorney’s negligence does not result in a loss of 
estate assets, but results in one or more of the decedent’s intended beneficiaries receiving 
less than intended (with one or more others receiving more than intended), the estate 
would not have suffered damages to be recovered. In such a circumstance, with the lack 
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of privity defense, “[t]he only person who has a valid claim has suffered no loss, and the 
only person who has suffered a loss has no valid claim.”19 
 
Perhaps that is the case in Shoemaker, as the farm Ms. Schlegel gave to one of her 
children and his wife would have been included in Ms. Schlegel’s taxable estate if she 
had not made the gift. While that result could have been avoided if she had made an 
outright gift,
20
 she apparently wanted to retain a life estate. Perhaps a claim could have 
been made by the estate’s executor that Ms. Schlegel was not advised of the tax 
consequences of the transaction and would have taken other more tax-wise action had she 
been so informed (such as making a series of annual exclusion gifts of interests in the 
farm to her son and his wife, without retaining a life estate). Such a claim, however, 
would have been speculative. 
 
With respect to the basic issue addressed by Shoemaker – whether lack of privity 
should bar a claim by an intended beneficiary of a decedent’s will against the lawyer who 
drafted the will – the Supreme Court acknowledged that there are policy reasons both in 
favor of and against the lack of privity defense. It concluded, however, that the policy 
considerations supporting the rule outweigh those against it. Relying on decisions from 
other jurisdictions that recognize the lack of privity defense, as well as its decision in 
Zipperstein, the Court summarized its rationale for the privity rule: 
 
 Primarily, the rule is used to protect the attorney's duty of loyalty and the 
attorney's effective advocacy for the client. Lewis v. Star Bank, N.A., Butler Cty. 
(1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 709, 712-713, 630 N.E.2d 418. The strict privity rule 
ensures that attorneys may represent their clients without the threat of suit from 
third parties who may compromise that representation. Barcelo v. Elliott 
(Tex.1996), 923 S.W.2d 575, 578-579. Otherwise, an attorney's preoccupation or 
concern with potential negligence claims by third parties might diminish the 
quality of legal services provided to the client if the attorney were to weigh the 
client's interests against the possibility of third-party lawsuits. See Zipperstein, 32 
Ohio St.3d at 76, 512 N.E.2d 636. 
 
Second, without the strict privity rule, the attorney could have conflicting duties 
and divided loyalties during the estate planning process. Third, there would be 
unlimited potential liability for the lawyer. See generally Sav. Bank v. Ward 
(1879), 100 U.S. 195, 203, 25 L.Ed. 621 (without privity of contract, “absurd 
consequences to which no limit can be seen” will ensue). In Ward, the United 
States Supreme Court, in its seminal case discussing privity, noted that “[t]he only 
safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract; if 
we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty.” Id. 
Rather than expose the lawyer to the fifty, we conclude that lawyers should know 
in advance whom they are representing and what risks they are accepting. 
 
The comment to Ohio's conflict of interest rule, Prof. Cond. R. 1.7, states: “The 
principles of loyalty and independent judgment are fundamental to the attorney-
client relationship and underlie the conflict of interest provisions of these rules. 
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Neither the lawyer's personal interest, the interests of other clients, nor the desires 
of third persons should be permitted to dilute the lawyer's loyalty to the client.” 
The rules of professional responsibility, therefore, also underscore the need to 
ensure that a lawyer is not liable to parties who are not in privity with the lawyers 
[sic] client.
21
 
 
 Moreover, what the Court characterized as the “bright-line rule of privity”22 
furthers the attorney’s loyalty to the client. As noted by the Court, according to 
Gindlesberger Ms. Schlegel received exactly what she intended – a transfer of her farm 
with a retained life estate. While the transfer was not advantageous from a tax 
perspective, a client “may not wish to optimize tax liability, instead seeking to further a 
different goal.”23 In sum, the Court declined to impose on estate planners a duty to 
beneficiaries because doing so “could lead to significant difficulty and uncertainty, a 
breach in confidentiality, and divided loyalties.”24 
 
 
Justice Moyer’s Concurrence 
  
In Shoemaker, the focus of the children’s claims against Gindlesberger was not 
his preparation of their mother’s will, but was instead his preparation of the deed by 
which she conveyed her farm, while retaining a life estate, and the estate tax 
consequences associated with that transfer. According to Justice Moyer’s separate 
concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Pfeifer and Lundberg Stratton, the 
children “cite no case in any jurisdiction [that] allows beneficiaries to sue the decedent’s 
attorney for negligence in a financial transaction independent of the will.”25 Unwilling to 
impose a duty on a lawyer to third persons in such circumstances, Justices Moyer, Pfeifer 
and Lundberg Stratton concurred with the majority’s decision. 
  
 Instead of simply joining the majority opinion, Justice Moyer issued a separate 
concurrence to state his view “that there would be compelling reasons to recognize a 
cause of action by an intended beneficiary against the decedent’s attorney for negligence 
in preparation of the will.”26 The opinion notes that courts in many other jurisdictions 
have allowed such claims and adopts the arguments of the dissent in Zipperstein: 
 
I am persuaded that, as Justice Brown argued [in Zipperstein], the issue of an 
attorney's conflict of interest does not arise if an intended beneficiary has a cause 
of action in negligence for an attorney's preparation of a will. I am also persuaded 
that there is a strong need for attorney accountability in preparing wills. It serves 
no purpose to continue to invoke a strict rule of privity to protect the malpractice 
of a lawyer when we have abrogated that rule with respect to the liability of other 
professionals, such as accountants and architects. For this reason, if presented 
with a different set of facts, I would be in favor of revisiting our decision in 
Zipperstein in the context of the holding of Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 
Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256.
27
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Again, two other justices joined Justice Moyer’s concurrence, making the holding in 
Shoemaker not to overrule Zipperstein a four to three decision. 
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 The rule allowing a malpractice claim to be asserted against an attorney when the plaintiff was in privity 
with the attorney’s client served as the basis for allowing a beneficiary of a decedent’s estate to sue the 
attorney for the personal representative of the estate in Elam v. Hyatt Legal Services, 541 N.E.2d 616 (Ohio 
1989). See also Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1994) (allowing claims by limited 
partners against the general partner’s attorney). Under R.C. §1339.18, however, which was enacted in 
response to Arpadi, and renumbered as §5815.16 in connection with the recent enactment of the Ohio Trust 
Code:  
(A) Absent an express agreement to the contrary, an attorney who performs legal services for a 
fiduciary, by reason of the attorney performing those legal services for the fiduciary, has no duty 
or obligation in contract, tort, or otherwise to any third party to whom the fiduciary owes fiduciary 
obligations. 
(B) As used in this section, “fiduciary” means a trustee under an express trust or an executor or 
administrator of a decedent’s estate. 
See Robert G. Dykes, “Scope of Lawyer's Duties in Estates and Trusts Clarified,” 9 PROB. L. J. OF OHIO 44 
(Jan./Feb. 1999); Wayne C. Dabb, Jr., “Bad News for Lawyers of Fiduciaries: The Arpadi Decision,” 5 
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  The Supreme Court’s opinion summarizes the claims of the two children who were not grantees of the 
farm under the deed: “Gindlesberger was negligent in preparing the document for the transfer of the … 
farm and in failing to advise their mother of the tax consequences of the transfer,” and the transfer 
“increased the estate’s tax liability.” Shoemaker at *1. The child who received the gift of the farm also sued 
Gindlesberger, alleging that his siblings’ “lawsuit claiming depletion of their inheritance was caused by 
Gindlesberger’s lack of knowledge of tax law.” Id. at *2. Presumably the farm was included in Ms. 
Schlegel’s taxable estate under section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code because of her retained life 
estate. The opinion indicates that Ms. Schlegel’s will did not equitably apportion the estate tax liability to 
the transfers that generated the tax, but instead provided for all estate taxes due as a result of her death to be 
paid from the residue of her estate. Thus, it appears that the two children who did not receive an interest in 
the farm their mother gave to their brother may have effectively paid two-thirds of the estate tax 
attributable to it, or if the estate assets were not sufficient to pay the estate taxes, that their inheritances 
were completely depleted. At the date of this writing, litigation between the siblings over the estate is 
pending. 
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 Because the children did not allege that Gindlesberger had engaged in fraud, bad faith, collusion or other 
malicious conduct, that exception to the privity rule was not applicable. Shoemaker at *3.  
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 Shoemaker at *2. As discussed in notes 14-18 and the accompanying text, the personal representative of 
Ms. Schlegel’s estate also was a party to the suit against Gindlesberger, and the status of that claim is not 
clear. 
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 Schlegel v. Gindlesberger, 2006 WL 3783537, at *4. 
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 The Schlegel children presented “a survey of several jurisdictions that allow beneficiaries to bring 
malpractice claims.” Shoemaker at *3. An amicus curiae brief filed by the Ohio Association for Justice 
(OAJ) that urged the Court to reject the privity defense cites cases from 22 jurisdictions it claims have done 
so. (The brief states that the OAJ was previously known as the Ohio Academy [of] Trial Lawyers and “is 
comprised of approximately 1,715 attorneys practicing personal injury and consumer law in the State of 
Ohio.”) 
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Tate, 192 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. 2006). 
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 Shoemaker at *2. 
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 Shoemaker at *5. 
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 The Court of Appeals’ opinion states: “The trial court granted Appellee Gindlesberger’s motion for 
summary judgment dismissing the legal malpractice claims filed by appellant and appellees.” Schlegel v. 
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 Ross v. Caunters, 3 All Eng. Rep. 580, 582 (Ch. 1980). Note that with the right set of facts, an alternative 
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for a malpractice case against the decedent’s attorney. Under one of the new Restatements, a will, “though 
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and convincing evidence” that (i) a mistake has occurred in the will and (ii) what the testator’s intention 
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reformed under such a rule under the recently enacted Ohio Trust Code. See R.C. §5804.15. 
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 If Ms. Schlegel had made an outright gift, the value of the gift, less any applicable annual exclusion, 
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have avoided estate tax. 
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